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Extending on an earlier paper [Found. Phys. Ltt., 16(4) 343355, (2003)], it is argued that instants of time 
and the instantaneous (including instantaneous relative position) do not actually exist. This conclusion, 
one which is also argued to represent the correct solution to Zenos motion paradoxes, has several 
implications for modern physics and for our philosophical view of time, including that time and space 
cannot be quantized; that contrary to common interpretation, motion and change are compatible with the 
block universe and relativity; and that time, space, and space-time too, cannot exist. Instead, motion 
and change become the major players.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Physics has a problem with change. Despite it appearing to be an essential feature of Nature, and 
physics itself―the study of matter, its motion, and the things that derive from this, such as energy and 
force―essentially being built upon it, physics also denies that motion and change are possible. In some 
instances this is done knowingly, as is the case with the standard interpretation of the block universe 
provided by relativity. Motion and change are seen to be illusions, incompatible with a fixed, four-
dimensional view of reality in which there is no preferred present moment, and all events, past, present, 
and future, are all laid out together. In other cases, I will argue, it is done inadvertently, with many 
unaware that making certain physical and mathematical assumptions render theory incompatible with 
the dynamic, changing universe we observe. Beginning with a discussion of Zenos motion paradoxes, 
it is argued that the assumption that zero-duration instants in time and the instantaneous actually exist is 
at the heart of this quandary, and that once this assumption is dispensed of on the grounds of non-
physicality and logical inconsistency, motion and change become entirely compatible with existing 
physics. Although instantaneous values, functions, and real numbers, remain very useful in physics, 
denying that the instantaneous exists is shown to resolve a number of paradoxes and problems, 
including Zenos motion paradoxes, and the so-called mismatch between the block universe, and 
motion and change [1]. As a consequence of instants in time not existing, it is argued that time, space, 
and space-time also cannot exist, while, as it would require the existence of instants and spatial points 
to bound and determine their magnitudes as intervals, time and space cannot be quantized [2, 3], nor 
can a so-called non-zero duration instant exist. It should be noted that this by no means negates the 
operational defining of Planck time = √ħG/c5 and Planck length = √ħG/c3. Surprisingly, and although 
publicly anyway, it seems he did not follow the conclusion through to its full implications for physics, 
late in his life, Einstein also denied the existence of instants [4].  
           
2. ZENOS PARADOXES 
 
One of the best-known problems in the history of physics, mathematics and philosophy are Zenos 
paradoxes, originally conceived by the Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea around 450 BC. They are so 
well known that I will avoid going over them here.2 I will, however, outline the historically accepted 
solutions to the three most famous ones: the Arrow, The Dichotomy, and Achilles and the Tortoise.   
      Of Zenos paradoxes, the Arrow is typically regarded as a different type of problem to the others, 
thus also requiring a different type of solution. Over the past 300 years it has usually been claimed that 
the Arrow paradox is resolved through calculus, the use of continuous functions, and the idea of 
limit. Although Isaac Newton and Gottfried Leibniz were the first to introduce these methods, it was 
not until the 19th century that a reasonably rigorous foundation to do this was provided with the 
epsilon-delta definition of limit by Augustin-Louis Cauchy and Karl Weierstrass. The essence of 
what they did was to dispense with infinitesimal-quantities and the infinite altogether, and instead think 
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2 For Zenos paradoxes, see, for example: Gruenbaun, A. Modern science and Zenos paradoxes. Wesleyan 
University Press, Middletown, Conn (1967). 
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in terms of relationships between small, but finite, quantities that can potentially be made arbitrarily 
small by taking them to an unreachable limit.  
A good way to think of this idea is to consider a polygon inside a circle, with the circle 
representing the limit of the polygons sides. If the number of polygons sides is increased, the lengths 
of the sides decrease, and the polygon gets closer and closer to becoming a circle and to reaching the 
limit. As it will always still have sides, the polygon can never actually get to be the circle, but it can get 
arbitrarily close, so for all practical purposes, it is said that it might as well be the circle.  
In this example, the polygon is analogous to an objects motion and velocity, and the circle, to the 
limit of the objects velocity at an instant. Thus, when applied to Zenos Arrow paradox, this means 
that, although the limit of the arrows velocity at the instant is never actually reached, as the time 
interval approaches zero (roughly analogous to the length of the polygons sides), the arrow can be 
taken arbitrarily close to it, so for all practical purposes, the arrow is said to have a non-zero velocity at 
the instant, and thus, not to be motionless. Furthermore, although not actually moving during the 
instant, if the arrows trajectory is traced out, it can be said to be in motion because it can be seen to 
occupy different locations at different times. This is the so-called at-at theory of motion [5]. As the 
arrow could be said to have an infinite-number of different positions at different times within this 
context, it is also sometimes claimed that the arrow is in motion at all instants in time (an infinite 
number of them).  
The paradoxes of Achilles and the Tortoise and the Dichotomy, on the other hand, have generally 
been thought to be solved by the summation of an infinite series, a mathematical technique developed 
by Cauchy, Weierstrass, and Richard Dedekind. In relation to the paradoxes, this means the summing 
of an infinite series of progressively small time intervals and distances, so that the time taken for 
Achilles to reach his goal and overtake the Tortoise, or to traverse the said distance in the Dichotomy, 
is, in fact, finite. The faulty logic in Zeno's argument is seen to be the assumption that the sum of an 
infinite number of terms is always infinite, when in fact, an infinite sum, for instance, 1 + 1/2 + 1/4 + 
1/8 + 1/16 + 1/32 + ..., can be mathematically shown to be equal to a finite number, or in this case, 
equal to 2. Therefore, Zeno's infinitely many subdivisions of any distance to be traversed can be 
mathematically reassembled to give the desired finite answer, and the body in apparent motion be said 
to have reached its apparent impossible goal.  
 
2.1 NO INSTANT IN TIME 
                                                                                                                                
In an earlier paper [6], it was argued that Zenos paradoxes assumed, as did physics in general, the 
existence of a zero-duration instant in time at which a body in relative motion could be said to be in an 
exactly determined or instantaneous relative position. Further, that if such instants did really exist, 
motion and change would be impossible. As they represent the present tense version of an instant, by 
default, this also applies to a present moment or now. If a moving object could be said to have a 
determined position relative to something else at an instant, as is the very nature of this ethereal 
notion―a static, durationless snap-shot of a physical process―the object would necessarily be 
frozen at that instant and could not be in motion at all. That is, it is that its relative position is 
constantly changing that enables a body to be in relative motion in the first place. By wrongly assuming 
that a moving body could be said to have an exact relative position at an instant―and then dissecting 
its motion as such―Zenos motion paradoxes were created. Thus, the solution to the paradoxes lays in 
recognizing that a body in relative motion cannot possibly have a instantaneous relative position, and as 
such, that its motion cannot be fractionally dissected as though it does. With its position constantly 
changing, it has already moved on. This applies to the paradoxes of Achilles and the Tortoise, the 
Dichotomy, its variations, as well as to the Arrow. As I would like to have a more detailed look at the 
solutions to the paradoxes, however, lets have a closer look at them.  
      The way in which calculus was thought to solve the paradoxes of Achilles and the Tortoise and the 
Dichotomy through the summation of an infinite series, certainly provided the correct answer in a 
strictly mathematical sense by giving up the desired finite number at the end of calculation. It was 
dependent, however, on an object in relative motion having an exact relative position at any given 
instant in time. Moreover, the summation of an infinite series here worked as a helpful mathematical 
tool to get rid of the infinities, but it did not actually resolve the paradoxes and show how the bodys 
motion was possible. In this physical context, it equated to little more than rounding up.  
The same fault applied to the Arrow paradoxs proposed solution, as the limit of the arrows 
velocity at the instant is never actually reached; strictly speaking, the arrow does not have a velocity at 
the instant. It cannot, as by definition, an instant has no duration, so the arrow cannot have a velocity at 
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an instant if there is no interval of time during which it could cover a distance. Indeed, to say that it 
could have one was like saying than a stationary body could at the same time be moving, or that a 
multi-sided polygon could also be a circle. Furthermore, by invoking this model, or the at-at theory, 
people were essentially agreeing that motion and change did not exist and were some sort of strange 
subjective illusion.  
      In all three paradoxes, and in the proposed solutions to them by calculus, it was taken for granted 
that a moving body had a determined relative position at any given instant in time. As explained earlier, 
this is not the case. Regardless of how small the time interval or slowly a body is moving, its position is 
constantly changing and undetermined. If this were not the case, it could not be in motion. When this 
realization is applied to the Arrow paradox, one also recognizes that there can be no instant in time 
underlying the arrows motion at which its volume would occupy just one block of space, and 
because its position is constantly changing and undetermined, the arrow is never static and motionless.  
      The paradoxes of Achilles and the Tortoise and the Dichotomy are resolved by this same 
realization. When the moving bodys associated position and time values are fractionally dissected in 
the paradoxes, an infinite regression can then be mathematically induced and the idea of motion shown 
to yield paradox, as such values are not representative of instants in time at which the body is actually 
at each exact position, but rather, of intervals of time during which the body is passing through 
specified intervals of distance. For example, a time value of 1 second (which indicates the time interval 
of 1 and 1.99999..., seconds, and not an instant), is not indicative of a time at which a bodys position 
might be determined while in motion, but rather, if measured accurately, is a representation of an 
interval in time during which the body is passing through a particular distance interval, say 1 meter 
(which indicates the distance interval of 1 and 1.99999..., meters, and not a precise spatial point). 
Incidentally, note that a spatial point is perfectly analogous to an instant, with the difference just being 
that it has no spatial extent, rather than no duration. As such, if instants or points in time have no 
physical basis, and an object in relative motion does not have an exact relative spatial position at one, 
points in space can have no physical basis either.  
      Finally, William James variation on the Dichotomy [7], where the emphasis is placed on a specific 
time not being reached rather than a distance, is also resolved by the same line of reasoning, and by 
recognizing that, in order to make each time dissection, the paradox assumes the existence of an instant 
in time in order to freeze and determine an exact time value, when, in fact, interval is constantly 
changing i.e. the hands of a clock continue to rotate (or even better, the capability for motion always 
remains present). If the time value in this version of the Dichotomy paradox was perhaps said to 
represent an interval of time rather than an instant (for example, the interval of 2 seconds, which 
represents the interval between 2 and 2.999..., seconds), in order to make the dissection, this assumes 
the existence of two instants (at 2 and 3 seconds) to bound and determine the interval, and the same 
applies. Interestingly, if the Dichotomy and Achilles and the Tortoise paradoxes were perhaps 
reformulated so that the focus was placed, not on the distance, but upon the time interval, so that there 
was always some time remaining rather than a distance, this simply becomes a restatement of William 
James' version of the paradox. 
 
2.2 NOTHING NEW UNDER THE SUN 
 
As with basically all ideas in science and philosophy, the thoughts underlying these conclusions are not 
all new. Over the centuries, going all the way back to the birth of Zenos paradoxes 2500 years ago, it 
is clear that a number of people were certainly thinking in the right direction about them. Probably the 
person that this most applied to was the first of them, Aristotle. When confronted with Zenos Arrow 
paradox, Aristotle replied that it was moot because time is not composed of indivisible moments 3 
[Physics VI:9, 239b8-9]. Aristotle was clearly right here, although he still maintained that nows and the 
present existed: Time, then, also is both made continuous by the now and divided by it [Physics 
IV:11, 220a4-5]. Aristotle also applied this argument solely to the Arrow paradox, and saw the 
paradoxes of the Dichotomy and Achilles and the Tortoise as being different problems:  
 
The result of the argument is that the slower is not overtaken: but it proceeds along the same 
lines as the bisection-argument. so that the solution must be the same. And the axiom that that 
which holds a lead is never overtaken is false: it is not overtaken, it is true, while it holds a lead: 
                                                
3 In some translations of Physics, nows replaces moments.  
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but it is overtaken nevertheless if it is granted that it traverses the finite distance prescribed 
[Physics VI:9, 239b20-29]. 
 
In his groundbreaking 1781 Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant argued that space and time do not 
belong to things as they are in themselves, but rather to our way of looking at things. They are forms of 
our perception, and it is our minds that impose space and time upon objects, and not objects that 
impose space and time upon our minds [8]. Kant correctly concluded that Zenos paradoxes could be 
resolved by this realization. In respect to being on the right track with Zenos paradoxes, in different 
ways, the same can also be said for Henri Bergson, William James, Alfred North Whitehead, Leo 
Tolstoy, Abraham Fraenkel, Karl Popper, Gerald Whitrow, David Robjant, Frank Arntzenius, David 
Albert, and no doubt a number of others. 
      
3. INSTANTANEOUS MAGNITUDES 
 
Not only does an object in relative motion not have a determined relative position, but all physical 
magnitudes cannot be determined at an instant either. If relative position is not determined at an instant, 
neither can velocity (the rate of change in relative position with respect to time).4 If velocity is not 
determined at an instant, neither can acceleration (the rate of change in velocity with respect to time), 
momentum (velocity multiplied by mass), kinetic energy Ek=½mv2, wave speed c, period T, frequency 
f, wavelength λ, radiation energy per quantum or Plancks relation E=hf, force F=ma, relativistic mass 
and relativistic momentum p=γmv, according to E=mc2, rest mass and energy, Newtons universal 
gravitation F=G(M1m2/r2), gravitational potential energy Ep=mgh, and through the subsequent 
derivation of the remainder of the equations of physics, neither can any physical magnitude.5 
Importantly, however, this universal indeterminacy in changeable physical magnitude is not associated 
with the preciseness of the measurement, or the result of quantum uncertainty.6 In exactly the same way 
that an object in motion does not have a determined relative position because its position is constantly 
changing, and the idea of its motion having a limit at an instant is faulty, instantaneous magnitudes 
do not exist either. Put another, more general way, the whole idea of Nature being frozen and 
determined at an instant is erroneous, as Nature is dynamic and forever changing.  
      The only situation in which a changeable magnitude would be precisely determined is if there were 
an instant in time underlying physical processes, and as a consequence, a system was frozen static at 
that instant. In such a system, an indivisible mathematical time value, say 2 seconds, would correctly 
represent an instant in time, rather than an interval in time. Fortunately this is not the case, for if it 
were, this static frame would include the entire universe, and the cosmos evolution would not be 
possible. Thankfully, it seems that Nature has wisely traded certainty for continuity, with there being a 
necessary trade off of determined physical magnitudes at a particular time, for their continuity over 
interval. 
 
3.1 INSTANTS AND INTERVAL 
 
Before continuing there are some technical issues associated with instants of time that I would like to 
touch on. Earlier it was explained that an instant in time could not exist, because if it did, as is its very 
nature, everything would by way of logical necessity also be frozen static at that instant. Although such 
a situation would enable a body to have a determined relative position, motion and change would be 
rendered impossible. Furthermore, everything would remain frozen at that instant, as by definition, an 
instant has no duration, so there could be no progression. Incidentally, the same outcome would also 
                                                
4 There has recently been debate over the existence of instantaneous velocities. See, Arntzenius, F. Are there really 
instantaneous velocities? Monist: An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry, 
83(2):187208 (2000); and, Smith, S. R. Are instantaneous velocities real and really instantaneous?: An argument 
for the affirmative. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 34B(2):261-280 (2003). 
5 One might ask if constants, such as the speed of light in a vacuum, negate this? Although such constants are 
exact, their being so is unrelated to the instantaneous. They are not determined at an instant.  
6 The only connection to quantum uncertainty here is that it is normally assumed that if it were not for the 
uncertainty principle, physical magnitudes would be exactly determined. The non-existence of instantaneous 
magnitudes means that, even if there were no such thing as quantum uncertainty, physical magnitudes would still 
not be exactly determined. The impetus of physics becomes entirely measurement based, whether actual or 
theoretical, and a question of precocity of such measurement i.e. intervals. That is, magnitudes such as energy and 
mass only gain their meaning through measurement.  
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result if an instant in time were hypothetically followed by a continuous sequence of further instants, as 
again, an instant has no duration, so neither could a further succession of them. In either case, rather 
than enabling motion, this would perpetuate a static instant in time, and motion and change would be 
impossible.  
However, there are some problems associated with such a conclusion. By definition, for something 
to be static, it must be unchanging for an extended interval of time. But how then could time be said to 
be frozen static at an instant when being so would require it to be static and unchanging for an extended 
interval? It seems a contradiction. In relation to a regular and sensible definition of static, this no doubt 
is. When the definition is applied to time itself, however, a paradox appears. If there were such things 
as instants in time, everything, including clocks, would also be frozen static, and interval in time would 
not be possible either. There could be no interval in time for something to remain unchanging. Thus, 
the normal definition of static breaks down when it is applied to time itself, and we are forced to search 
for a revised definition for this special temporal case. Thankfully, such a definition quickly becomes 
evident, and simply requires one to qualify the use of stasis by defining static in the case of time as not 
being over duration. In spite of this, it should also be just enough to be aware of the problem of 
applying the notion of stasis to time itself and to not worry too much about it, including in connection 
to the use of words such as remain in this context. 
 
4. THE EXISTENCE OF TIME, SPACE AND SPACE-TIME 
 
The conclusion that instants in time and instantaneous magnitudes do not exist has some further 
implications. Perhaps the most striking one relates to the nature of time itself. If there is no such thing 
as an instant in time, there can also be no flow or passage of time, for without a continuous 
progression through indivisible instants or nows (the things that would constitute the building blocks of 
time) over an extended duration, there can be no physical progression or flow. In other words, there is 
nothing there, no temporal stepping-stone, for which time could possibly use to progress. Somewhat 
similar to how an invisible ether was once assumed to permeate throughout the entire universe, 
Newtons invisible river of time, assumed by many to enable motion and change as it proceeded, 
cannot exist either. It has no water. Further, the same can be said for the existence of space due to the 
lack of spatial points.  
What this means is that, not only are time and space not absolute, with judgements of position in 
space and nows in time being relative (the time aspect being shown by relativity), but there are no such 
things as relative position, nows, nor things called time or space, existing independently of us at 
all. This may seem counter-intuitive, for in respect to time, it might suggest that if it were not a 
fundamental physical entity, the entire universe would be frozen static and motionless at one particular 
instant as though stuck on pause on a movie screen. However, if the universe were frozen in such a 
manner, this would constitute an instant of time―time would be a physical thing, rather than not. 
Indeed, so presumably would space, as such an instant would represent the same thing (i.e. a static 
block of something, somehow different from matter, filling the entire universe), while also having 
the same affect on continuity. Thus, it seems that it is actually due to Natures exclusion of time and 
space as fundamental physical things, that motion and change are possible, and that intervals of time 
and space are able to represented by clocks and meters in the first place.  
      The idea that time might not flow and that the passage of time may be an illusion, is clearly not at 
all a new one, and from the time of the ancient Greeks, a number of different arguments have been put 
forward supporting the notion.7 In addition to the lack of differentiation between past, present and 
future in relativity, one of the best was the question posed by the Australian philosopher of science, 
Jack Smart. How fast does time pass? [9]. Speed is defined as the rate of change of position with 
respect to time. So how then can time possibly move in time? One second per second? This should 
have really spelt the end to the idea of a flowing time, but as it is the intuitive view―and indeed, no 
doubt extricably tied up with our conscious perceptions―its existence has continued to be assumed by 
many. With, perhaps, a perceived lack of a truly fundamental argument against times passage, some 
have also seemed happy to sit on the fence about the issue. That many people seem to assume that time 
and space as they enter general relativity are literally curved by the presence of matter and energy, as if 
                                                
7 Today, Carlo Rovelli is a notable exponent of the hypothesis that both time and space do not exist. See, for 
example, Rovelli, C. The disappearance of space and time, in Dieks, D. (ed.), The ontology of spacetime. The 
philosophy and foundations of physics, Volume 1, pp. 2536. Elsevier (2006). 
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they were actual physical things (rather than just interval in time as represented by a clock, and 
interval in space―length, width and height―as represented by a ruler, being dilated by them, and, 
among other things, the non-Euclidean geometry of general relativity providing an effective way of 
modeling the motion of a body within this context), would not have helped much either.  
Indeed, the absence of instants in time and spatial points spells bad news not only for time and 
space, but for space-time as well. As they assume instants and spatial points in order to bound and 
determine their contributing temporal and spatial values as intervals, time and spatial coordinates in 
special and general relativity also have no physical reality. This then means that the same can also be 
said for space-time points (which consist of one time and three spatial coordinates), space-time 
intervals (the distance between two space-time points on a space-time manifold), and as such, the 
space-time continuum itself.  
In relation to space-time having no physical existence, this is far from a revelation. Late in his life, 
Einstein himself held this view.8 It just seems that this point has been lost on a number of subsequent 
physicists and mathematicians, seemingly unable to make the same differentiation and recognize the 
limits of applicability of Einsteins model of space and time.9 As the reality of space-time would have 
been seen by many physicists and mathematicians as being more of a philosophical question―a 
distraction to the real business of solving equations―some would also have not been overly concerned 
with such an issue. The existence of theories that assume the physical reality of space-time―for 
example, relativistic time-travel [10, 11], imaginary time [12], and arguably, cosmological inflation 
[13]―would bare witness to this.  
Paradoxically, even physicists who held that time or space-time did not exist, seem to have failed to 
realize that by assuming that events were underpinned by instants and nows, they were inadvertently 
saying that time and space-time did exist. Perhaps the most striking example of this is the Oxford 
physicist Julian Barbour, who made instants and nows a central feature of what he saw as being a 
completely timeless view of the universe [14]. However, the same can also just be said for physicists 
who assumed that Newtonian mechanics, special and general relativity, or quantum theory (in the 
context of formalism like Schrödingers equation), provided an accurate description of Nature, in the 
sense of assuming that an instant or a space-time event, both static entities, had a physical basis. The 
same can again be said for the positing of definite positions in Bohmian mechanics [15].   
Surprisingly, although also somewhat unsurprisingly, it seems that late his life, not only did 
Einstein negate the existence of space-time, but the existence of instants too. Up until near the end of 
his life, Einstein regularly talked meaningfully, in a physical sense, of instants and exact positions and 
magnitudes, not taking issue with them. Three such examples, two from his 1905 paper on special 
relativity [16], and one from an essay written on the occasion of his 70th birthday in 1949 [4], are 
included below:  
  
...that is to say that their [synchronized clocks] indications correspond at any instant to the time of the 
stationary system at the places where they happen to be. [p. 4] 
 
If the electron is at rest at a given epoch, the motion of the electron ensues in the next instant of time 
according to the equations...[p. 20] 
 
A problem arises only when we ascribe group-characteristics to a theory, i.e., if we assume or postulate that 
the same physical situation admits of several ways of description, each of which is to be viewed as equally 
justified. For in this case we obviously cannot ascribe complete objective meaning (for example the x 
[position]-component of the velocity of a particle or its x-coordinates) to the individual (not eliminable) 
magnitudes. [p. 680]  
  
      In relation to not taking exception with instants, however, there is a rather notable exception. 
Somewhat at odds with the quote just above, in the very same essay, while arguing the statistical 
interpretation of quantum theory was incomplete, we find this:  
 
To this the quantum theorist will reply: This consideration stands and falls with the assertion that there 
actually is such a thing as a definite time of disintegration of the individual atom (an instant of time existing 
                                                
8 Space-time does not claim-existence in its own right, but only as a structural quality of the [gravitational] field.  
Einstein, A. Relativity: The special and general theory. Appendix V, (1952), p. 155. Methuen & Co Ltd (1920).  
9 This by no means implies all. See, for example, Brown, H. R., Pooley, O. Minkowski space-time: a glorious non-
entity, in Dieks, D. (ed.), The ontology of spacetime. The philosophy and foundations of physics, Volume 1, pp. 
6789. Elsevier (2006).  
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independently of any observation). But this assertion is, from my point of view, not merely arbitrary but 
actually meaningless. The assertion of the existence of a definite time-instant for the disintegration makes 
sense only if I can in principle determine this time-instant empirically... 
     One may not merely ask: "Does a definite time instant .for the transformation of a single atom exist?" but 
rather: "Is it, within the framework of our theoretical total construction, reasonable to posit the existence of a 
definite point of time for the transformation of a single atom?" One may not even ask what this assertion 
means. One can only ask whether such a proposition, within the framework of the chosen conceptual system - 
with a view to its ability to grasp theoretically what is empirically given - is reasonable or not. Insofar, then, 
as a quantum-theoretician takes the position that the description by means of a Psi-function refers only to an 
ideal systematic totality but in no wise to the individual system, he may calmly assume a definite point of time 
for the transformation. But, if he represents the assumption that his description by way of the Psi-function is to 
be taken as the complete description of the individual system, then he must reject the postulation of a specific 
decay-time. [p. 668] 
 
      In other words, here Einstein denied the existence of instants of time on the basis of their not being 
empirically verifiable, and thus, also rejected that an atom could decay at a definite exact time. With his 
earlier comment suggesting that he had yet to, and with no further related writings on the topic, one can 
only speculate whether Einstein later took this conclusion through to its logical ends. 
 
4.1 MOTION VS. INTERVAL 
     
      Before continuing, it may be a good idea to briefly reiterate some things. Time, space, and space-
time too, do not exist. Physical continuity (i.e. the capability for events to be continuous), and as such, 
motion and change, do exist, however, and this in turn enables the hands of a clock to rotate, and thus, 
one to indicate an interval of time. It also enables progression along the length of a ruler, and one to 
indicate an interval of length or space. This then in turn also provides intervals to use for space-time 
coordinates and to derive a space-time manifold in relativity. As such, because the presence of physical 
continuity enables one to indicate intervals with a clock or ruler, interval of time and space, and 
consequently, space-time too, still have much meaning in physics. 
 
Time is what a clock measures 
 
Despite the above quote, now an oft-cited response by physicists to the question of What is time?, 
it should be noted that, strictly speaking, clocks and rulers do not actually measure intervals of time 
and space. As they do not refer to anything except themselves, they themselves represent them. That 
is, there is no flow of time, and it is physical continuity which is basic and fundamental, not interval, so 
there is nothing there to measure. In a similar sense as running or jumping are secondary to movement 
and motion, interval is a derivative concept and secondary to physical continuity, and as such, motion 
and change.  
Interestingly, the above quote is often attributed to Einstein. That Einstein would have said this 
puzzled me, particularly as a key feature of the dilation of time in relativity was Einsteins treatment of 
time as being nothing more than that what a clock showed. On locating Einsteins original quote, it 
came as no surprise then to find that what he actually said, Zeit ist das, was man an der Uhr abliest 
[17], translates to Time is what one reads off the clock." Although the difference seems tiny, as 
measure asserts that there is something there to be measured, while reads neither affirms or 
denies times existence (but leans towards the latter), it is actually quite big. With Einstein not 
believing that time existed: Time and space are modes by which we think and not conditions in which 
we live [18], and on finally embracing general covariance, by which time and space are robbed of the 
last trace of objective reality [19], I think it doubtful that his choice of words here are a coincidence.  
The question of intervals existence is a very subtle topic, however, especially so because an 
assertion that is physical continuity which is basic and fundamental rather than interval, could equably 
be reversed, and interval in time and space be said to have physical existence (something which could 
be measured), this making physical continuity, and as such, motion and change possible. This is 
because both are completely indistinguishable, in so far as they both represent exactly the same thing 
(i.e. the capability for events to be continuous). Yet, they are also mutually exclusive, in that only one 
can be fundamental and come first. This poses a brilliant paradox, as, and although the same cannot be 
said for a specific interval of time or space due to, by definition, their requiring the existence of instants 
and spatial points to bound and determine their respective values as intervals, this indistinguishability 
also makes it impossible, in purely logical sense anyway, to say whether it is physical continuity, and 
as such, motion and change, which is basic and fundamental (with interval having no physical 
existence), or if it is the existence of interval which makes continuity possible.  
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However, I think that once this paradox has been brought to light, it becomes evident that the 
indistinguishability between the two is the major cause of people mistakenly attributing physical reality 
to interval in the first place. They have not realized that there is a more basic explanation. I also think it 
doubtful that Nature would go to the trouble of giving interval in time and space existence, when just 
the presence of motion would fulfil the same purpose. Finally, unlike us, without a need to measure 
intervals of time and space, Nature also has no reason to bother attributing reality to them!   
 
5. BLOCK TIME 
 
What of the mismatch between the block universe and change? As explained earlier, relativity tells 
us that all times in the universe, past, present and future, are all laid out together in a fixed, four-
dimensional space-time block. This follows as a natural consequence of the lack of a preferred present 
motion in relativity. However, this block view of time seems to be very much at odds with how we as 
people seem to experience the world where, subjectively, time seems to flow. Indeed, a number of 
physicists and philosophers view this seeming incompatibility as representing a real problem, because 
with all events and times already laid out together, they do not see that this allows for motion and 
change [1]. In an effort to remedy this, some have gone as far to posit that time does indeed flow in 
relativity, with it being claimed that proper time evolves along families of world lines. It is argued that 
this then allows for the existence of the present, the past, and for physical evolution, and thus, an 
Evolving block universe [20]. More often, however, people just accept that motion and change are 
illusions [14, 21]―even though such a view is also incompatible with the need for the continuity and 
associated motion of neural processes that an observer would require in order to subjectively perceive 
such an illusion.  
      However, as long as one recognizes that instants, the instantaneous, and space-time points―all 
static, discontinuous entities―do not actually exist, motion can still take place with such a block 
view. One must just solely focus on the matter and motion in the universe, and except for the interval 
as represented by a clock being used as the reference, completely forget about time, the past, present 
and future, while recognizing that instants and space-time points are simply constructs. Furthermore, 
one can still assign an order to events in Nature, in the same way one can say that 2 follows 1, and 3 
follows 2, without making reference to tense, before and after, past and future.10 This also naturally 
applies to the readings of a clock. If interpreted in this way, any potential problem disappears, and 
motion and change can be seen to be entirely compatible with a timeless view of reality in which there 
is no preferred present moment. That is, while the lack of differentiation between past, present and 
future in relativity negates a flow of time, it by no means negates motion and change. The only thing 
that does this is the assumption that the instantaneous is real, or the presumption that without time, 
motion is not possible. The Evolving block universe explicitly assumes both. Indeed, and although 
one can certainly sympathise with the motivation behind doing so, by asserting the existence of time 
and the present, such a model only guarantees that motion and physical evolution would be impossible. 
 
6. TIME AND SPACES QUANTIZATION 
 
Lastly, a further implication of the conclusion that instants in time and spatial points do not exist relates 
to the question of whether time and space may be quantized and come as discrete atoms―particles of 
time and space [4, 5]. In light of the conclusions discussed in this paper, it becomes evident that the 
very reason events are continuous in the first place is due to there not being an atom or quantum of time 
or space. As such particles would represent a smallest possible interval―not just the smallest that we 
are able to operationally define as per Planck time 5.39124(27) x 10-44 seconds and Planck length 
1.616252(81) x 10−35 meters, but which actually physically exist―such intervals would require starting 
and stopping points to bound and determine them as intervals. As was discussed earlier, if such stops 
existed, motion and change would be impossible. For this same reason, a so-called non-zero duration 
instant cannot exist either. This does not mean, however, that the readings of clocks and meters cannot 
be quantized. With any clock and meter being constituted of matter, they should be. But this has 
nothing to do with time and space being quantized. Rather, matter.    
 
7. DISCUSSION 
 
                                                
10 In this same way, the thermodynamic arrow of time becomes a question of the relative order of events (i.e. 1, 2, 
3 or 3, 2, 1), rather than of the direction of time. 
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It has been argued that despite generally being assumed to in physics, instants in time and the 
instantaneous do not exist. Although reality might disagree, in many cases whether or not instants exist 
is of no consequence. With or without instants, the equations of physics still work exactly the same and 
the numbers that they provide remain just as useful. The real problem arises when these faulty 
assumptions are not recognized and then lead to contradiction and paradox (as with Zenos paradoxes, 
or the perceived mismatch between the block universe and change), or they are unknowingly built into 
theories whose possible validity is dependent on them (as with time and spaces quantization). 
Naturally, the same pothole lays in wait for theories that assume the existence of time, space, or space-
time.  
      It is surprising that the existence of instants and instantaneous magnitudes seem to have always just 
been assumed, but I think there are at least three good reasons for how this may have come about. The 
first is attributable to the nature of mathematics, as when applied to physics, it implies that functions 
and mathematical values are indicative of instants and instantaneous values rather than intervals. 
Indeed, a similar thing can be said for a photograph, with people often assuming that a picture is 
representative of an instant of time, rather than a small interval. Secondly, I believe that we actually 
think within the context of an instant in time and project it onto the world around us [22]. For example, 
if one thinks of a car driving down the road and is asked if it has a determined relative position to the 
road, one can mentally picture it having one, so assumes that it does. Indeed, one can only mentally 
picture the moving car in the context of static frames or instants. As with time in general, when 
something is fundamentally ingrained in the way a person actually thinks, it can be very difficult to see 
around it. I think this especially applies to the present, with it being irreducibly tied up with our ability 
to be consciously aware [22]. Lastly, I think that most people just assumed that issues such as the 
instantaneous and limits were settled and beyond reproach. Their validity was not thought to be in 
question. This also probably represents the works greatest obstacle, as a number of people seem to find 
it very difficult to believe that we could have got it wrong. It just seems a bit too unlikely.  
The most common criticism of the work has been that it has no mathematical model to back it up. 
This has also surprised me. Much of the point of the work is to show that calculus has its limitations 
when trying to accurately represent Nature―something dynamic―in the sense that it freezes 
everything upon being applied. To try to employ calculus itself to show this would be impossible; akin 
to trying to use sound to explain why sound cannot be used to describe taste. The same applies to 
perhaps employing nonstandard analysis, a branch of mathematics developed by Abraham Robinson 
during the 1960s, which provides more of a logical foundation for infinitesimals [23]. 
Finally, it should also be noted that, other than that motion and physical continuity should be 
possible, and that time and space are not quantized, this work is not able to make any verifiable 
predictions. That is, we already know that physical continuity is possible, as my being able to write this 
demonstrates, so predicting that it should be is a bit redundant! Perhaps trying to devise an experiment 
to prove the non-existence of instants of time, time or space, when none of them will ever show up in 
an experiment, is also a bit redundant―not to mention slightly paradoxical. This places a firm limit on 
the works value to physics as a theory. Indeed, with it being more concerned with the foundations of 
physical theory, it is not really a theory at all. At the same time, with the instantaneous being so deeply 
imbedded in them, both overtly and veiled, and with questions relating to the existence of time also 
being very pertinent in both, I think that some non-trivial work in quantum mechanics and quantum 
gravity could potentially stem from ideas discussed in this paper.  
   
Thanks to Kirstin Thompson, Fran Healy and Bruce Wonnacott.      
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